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Abstract
A ¯scal policy rule in which taxation is a function of existing government debt
(a \wealth-tax") is usually believed to be e®ective in providing stability. Using a
discrete-time version of Blanchard's overlapping generations model, extended to in-
cludemoney and an endogenouslaboursupply weshow that, contrary to theintuition,
a wealth tax might not be enough to ensure the existence of a unique, well de¯ned,
saddle-path equilibrium. We suggest that a government willing to run a positive and
sustainable level of debt could use an alternative ¯nancing rule, imposing an addi-
tional tax component, that is a function of the di®erence between the real interest
rate and the tax rate on wealth.
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The sustainability of ¯scal policy is an issue that has interested economists at least since
Keynes (1923) and Domar (1944). Christ (1979) studied the implications of di®erent rules
for stability, in an ad hoc Keynesian framework.
In more recent times, this interest has also been fostered by policy-related events. The
high levels of public debts in several European countries, for example, have been the cause
of great concern among policy makers and public opinion in relation to the constitution
of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Expressions like unsustainability, instability and
default risk have entered the day-to-day debate on economic policies. The fears related to
growing debts have been translated in to the strict constraint imposed by the Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Outside the EMU, the UK government and the
House of Commons approved, in 1998, the Finance Act and the Code for Fiscal Stability.
These documents specify two key ¯scal rules that have to be followed in policy making.
The \golden rule" requires that, over the economic cycle, the Government will borrow only
to invest and not to fund current spending, while the \sustainable investment rule" rec-
ommends that the public sector net debt to GDP ratio is kept over the economic cycle at
a \stable and prudent level". In the US, proposals aimed at imposing constitutional con-
straints on the Federal Government borrowing capabilities have been recently put forward.
A Balanced Budget Amendment was rejected by the Senate only by one vote both in 1995
and in 1997.
The above examples show that the sustainability of public ¯nances is a topical issue.
At the same time, some of the resolutions and proposals that emerged in the policy arena
have been criticized for not being based on rigorous economic foundations. This suggests
that more academic research aimed at investigating, both theoretically and empirically, the
implications of ¯scal policy rules for sustainability is highly desirable.
Blanchard et al. (1990), for example, construct short, medium andlong-term indicators
of sustainability. Their exercise, based on the idea that a sustainable policy is one that
does not violate the intertemporal budget constraint, has the merit to acknowledge the
3importance of forward looking behaviour in a®ecting policy outcomes. This approach,
however, can be criticized on the grounds of being mostly an accounting exercise, that
heavily depends on how good the forecasts about future variables are.
In our opinion, there is a need to use modern, fully microfounded models to investi-
gate which ¯scal policy rules are \stable", in the sense that they are consistent with the
existence of a well de¯ned equilibrium and of a unique convergent path. The most natural
candidates for this kind of analysis are models of overlapping generations, in which Ricar-
dian equivalence is broken and the debt is allowed to have real e®ects. A contribution in
this direction is the work by Rankin and Ro±a (1999), that uses a Diamond (1965) type,
two-period-lives model to investigate the existence of a maximum sustainable level of debt.
The main question they want to address is whether there can occur \catastrophes", de¯ned
as situations in which a well-de¯ned debt steady-state suddenly ceases to exist while other
variables, like consumption and the capital stock, still lay in an economically feasible range
of values. Because of their interest in catastrophes, they mostly concentrate on comparing
various steady-states for constant levels of debt, and they do not conduct a comparative
analysis of di®erent ¯scal policy rules.
In this paper, we aim at comparing the dynamic e®ects of di®erent ¯scal policy rules,
including ones in which the level of debt is endogenous, rather than being ¯xed at some
constant, exogenous level. To do this, we use a modi¯ed version of the perpetual youth
model provided by Blanchard (1985), in which agents face in every period a positive proba-
bility of death. Our point of departure is the discrete time treatment of Blanchard's model
provided by Frenkel and Razin (1996). In the original Blanchard framework, disposable
income is either given or it follows an exogenously imposed declining path.1 In our model,
by endogenising the labour supply, we take in to account the impact of the labour-leisure
trade o® decisions of agents. On the other hand, we assume that labour is the only fac-
tor of production. Since in Blanchard (1985) capital is endogenous, our contribution is
orthogonal to his in this respect.
1Disposable income is endogenous in Blanchard's model (since the real wage is endogenous), but it is
given to the agent himself.
4The model that we present is similar to others that have been recently developed in
the literature. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), for example, use a perpetual youth model to
study the interaction between monetary and ¯scal policy. While they introduce nominal
rigidities in the analysis, they retain the original assumptionof anexogenous labour supply.
Another similar model is developed by Heijdra and Ligthart (2000), whose focus is not on
debt, but on comparing the macroeconomic e®ects of three di®erent tax regimes (capital,
labour income and consumption tax).
We conduct three policy experiments. For comparative purposes, we start by looking
at the case in which the government is not allowed to use debt at all. We ¯nd that the
introduction of a positive probability of death is not enough, by itself, to cause an e®ect
of balanced budget expansions on the real interest rate. This policy, on the other hand,
reduces both consumption and leisure. The overall welfare e®ect is therefore negative.
We then study a policy similar to the one considered by Blanchard (1985), in which a
government is initially holding its debt constant, and subsequently decides to increase the
level of debt to a new, higher, steady state. As government expenditure is constant, we are
assuming that taxes adjust endogenously to meet the increased payments of interest. We
show that, under our assumption, this policy raises the real interest rate.
We ¯nallyconsider the caseof a\wealthtax", inwhichtaxation is an increasingfunction
of government debt (that enters positively the wealth of agents). Contrary to what we
could expect, making taxes an increasing function of existing debt does not automatically
guarantees stability. The presence of a wealth tax might not be enough to ensure the
existence of a unique, well-de¯ned saddle path leading to the equilibrium. In this situation,
it could be the case that a huge increase in the tax coe±cient on debt is needed in order
to have a saddle path solution. Such an increase, however, could be not easy to implement
for the government, because of political pressures. We suggest an alternative rule that
can yield the same outcome, in which the government drastically reduces the tax rate on
debt but adds another tax component, that is a function of the di®erence between the real
interest rate and the tax coe±cient on debt wealth. Our intention here is not to suggest
5that such a rule would be optimal, but only to give some insights in to what policy could
be followed by a government that is in a position of having to control is debt, but that
is prevented from implementing more stringent policies because of some political reasons.
We believe that this situation re°ects the dilemma faced by some European governments
in the early 1990s, that were in a situation of having to reduce drastically their debt, but
could not rely on very large parliamentary majorities to undertake more structural policies,
like heavy taxation of wealth or permanent cuts in government expenditure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, section 3 analyzes
some steady-state and dynamic properties in the case in which there is no public sector,
that is nested in our more general speci¯cation. Sections 4 and 5 look at the e®ects of
di®erent policy rules, while Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 The Model
2.1 Private Agents
We consider a closed economy. In every period each agent faces a constant probability of
death (1 ¡ q): We also assume no population growth. The size of the cohorts of agents
born in every period is constant across time and can be normalized to 1: The size of the
world population is therefore constant as well and equal to
P1
a=0qa = 1
1¡q. Only one good
is produced in the economy. Agents gain utility from consumption, money balances and
leisure. In what follows, we introduce the optimization problem of a representative agent
of age a at time t. Before proceeding with the illustration of the model, it is useful to
clarify our terminology. We will call variables relating to an individual of age a individual
variables, while aggregate variables will be the one obtained aggregating across individuals
of all the di®erent ages, and per-capita variables will be aggregate variables divided by the
size of the population.
The representative agent maximizes the expected utility function2








+ Ãlog(1¡ La+s¡t;s)] (1)
Where all the parameters are positive, 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor; C;
M
P and L
denote consumption, real balances and leisure respectively. Preferences are homothetic and
separable in consumption, real balances and leisure. The endowment of time in each period
is normalized to 1: La+s¡t;s is the quantity of labour supplied in every period, (1¡La+s¡t;s)
is leisure. Astandard assumption in this framework is the existence ofinsurancecompanies.
We assume that insurance companies pay a net premium of (
1¡q
q ) on the agent's ¯nancial
wealth for each period of his life, while they encash the agent's ¯nancial wealth if the agent
dies.3 Agents can hold ¯nancial wealth as real balances or as government debt. Inaddition,
they supply labour and pay lumps-sum taxes. The representative agent's period t budget













La;t ¡ ¿t (2)
Where D;W;r;¿ and P denote respectively government debt, nominal wage, real in-
terest rate, real lump-sum taxes and prices. The agent's maximization problem is also
subject to a standard No-Ponzi Game condition. It can be shown that solving the agent's
optimization problem, aggregating across ages and dividing by the population size we can
derive the per-capita equations that we present in next sub-section.
Before presentingthese equations, it is useful to specify thetechnology usedby ¯rms and
the behavior of the government. In order to make aggregation possible, we assume that
the agents supply their labour in a perfectly competitive market. For the same reason,
the other variables.
3As agents die in each period with probability q; these arrangements ensure a safe return of 1 on money
and of (1 + rt) on debt.
4Note the di®erent timing convention for money and assets. Money between periods t ¡ 1 and t is
denoted by t¡1, while government liabilities between t¡1 and t are indexed by t. This timing convention
is used, for example, by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996, Ch. 10).
7we assume that the marginal productivity of labour is invariant across ages. Another
simplifyingassumptionis thatlabour is the onlyfactorof production, withconstant returns.
The technology used by ¯rms is therefore
Yt = Lt (3)
Where Lt is the quantity of labour used in the production process. Under these assump-
tions, from the pro¯t maximization condition we obtain
Wt
Pt = 1 in every period t.
In this paper we abstract from utility enhancing government spending. The government
therefore spends on public expenditure that does not a®ect private utility. Government
expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt can be ¯nanced by seigniorage,
lump-sum taxes and issuing of new debt, according to the single-period budget constraint




In addition to this, the government must also respect a No-Ponzi game condition. It is
important to notice that, since the government has an in¯nite life horizon, the real interest
rate applied to Dt in (4) is (1 + rt); as opposed to
(1+rt)
q in the private agents' budget
constraint.
2.2 Per-Capita Variables
All per-capita variables will be indexed by the superscript PC: It is also useful to de¯ne
formally total wealth as the sum of ¯nancial and human wealth
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8Human wealth is de¯ned as the present discounted value of potential gross earnings
(that would be earned if the agent chose to consume no leisure), minus taxes.5
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Notice that, in the aggregation of wealth, we have used the fact that both taxes and
real wages are invariant across ages, and that real wages can be set to 1 with the special
production function (3). As a consequence, per-capita human wealth is equal to individual
wealth for each agent.
5Of course, as leisure provides utility, agents will not choose to supply a quantity 1 of work in each
period as long as the parameter on leisure in the utility function is positive (Ã > 0).
6The size of each cohort of agents is normalized to 1, and each agents has a probability of surviving in
every period equal to q: For the law of large numbers, therefore, qa is the number of agents of each cohort
that survive till the age a:















(1 ¡ q)qaLa;t = 1¡ Ã(1¡ q)
1 X
a=0
qaCa;t = 1 ¡ÃCPC
t (9)
The latter relationship is useful to illustrate an important characteristic of the model,
namely the fact that private consumption and output (equal to the quantity of labour
supplied) are determined by government expenditure. To show this, notice that in this








t + Gt (10)
Solving for LPC
t and CPC




















In the case in which leisure does not provide utility (Ã = 0); equations (11) and (12)
reproduce the neo-classical result of no e®ect on output and complete crowding-out of
consumption following a ¯scal expansion (dY=dG = 0 , dC=dG = ¡1). In this case agents
supply inelastically all their endowment of time. The balanced-budget multiplier derived
in the IS/LM literature, (dY=dG = 1; dC=dG = 0); on the other hand, emerges in the
limiting case in which Ã ! 1.
While Y PC
t and CPC
t can be expressed as functions of an exogenous, predetermined
variable like government expenditure, the real interest rate is a function of its future lev-
els, behaving like a \jump" variable. In order to see this, it is useful to go through the
intermediate step of characterizing the dynamic behavior of consumption.
102.3 Per-Capita Consumption Dynamics








t + (1+ rt)q¯C
PC
t¡1 (13)
In the case of in¯nite life (q = 1) equation (13) reduces to a standard Euler equation.
In that case human wealth is not relevant for predicting future consumption. The above
expression also nests the logarithmic case in the Frenkel and Razin (1996) model, in which
money and leisure do not provide utility (Â = Ã = 0).
3 Steady State and Dynamics without Government
Wewill now characterize thesteady-state and thedynamics of themodel. Itis convenient to
consider ¯rst the case in which government expenditure, taxes and debt are permanently
¯xed to zero. As the model displays multiple equilibria, one issue that arises is how to
discriminate between them. The preliminary analysis of this section gives some insights
about this, that will also turn out to be useful once we reintroduce the government in the
model.
3.1 Steady State




: It follows that a steady-state version of equation (13) is7



















1 +r ¡ q
(15)







Substituting (15) in (14) and denoting with R = 1 + r the gross real interest rate we can













To solve explicitly for R from this equation would be possible, but not very illuminating.
The implications of (16) are more easily understood looking at Figure 1.
The two solutions of (16) are the points in which the parabola f( R) = R
2
meets the





1+Â+Ã)(1 ¡ q)(1 + Ã)]gR ¡
1
¯
: Given the ranges of values of
the parameters, the slope of this line is obviously positive. From Figure 1 it is clear that
we are faced with two possible equilibria. As the real interest rate is expected to behave
like a jump variable, one way of discriminating between them is to select the unstable
one. This can only be done after characterizing the dynamics of R: However, we can
discriminate between the two di®erent steady-states even before looking at the dynamics,
if we assume that deviations from the Ricardian equivalence case (q = 1), are not too large.
In particular, we can notice that, when Ricardian equivalence holds (q = 1), equation (16)
12yields the two solutions RL = 1 and RH =
1
¯:8 In this case only the higher equilibrium is a
well de¯ned steady-state. This can be seen considering that, since there is no in°ation in
the steady state, R = 1 implies r = i = 0; i.e. an in¯nite money demand. In addition, it
is clear from equation (15) that R = 1 also implies an in¯nite level of steady-state human










1+Â+Ã); is negative, in the neighborhoods of this
value a fall in q implies an increase of the \higher" equilibrium (that is a movement from
RH to R
0
H in Figure 1) and a fall of the \lower" equilibrium (from RL to R
0
L in Figure 1):
It follows that, if the deviation from the in¯nite life case is not too big (if q is not too much
smaller than 1), we are sure that RL becomes smaller than one. Since in a zero in°ation
steady-state nominal and real interest rate coincide, RL implies a negative nominal interest
and cannot be considered a well-de¯ned steady-state.
As we are going to show in what follows, the analysis of the dynamics of the model
will lead to the same conclusion. In particular, it will allow us to prove that, even for
large deviations from Ricardian equivalence, reducing q rises (lowers) the higher (lower)
equilibrium. This conclusion will give more generality to the arguments developed above.
3.2 Dynamics
In this simpli¯ed version, the dynamics of the model can be summarized by a ¯rst-order





[1 ¡ (1+ Ã)
(1 ¡ q¯)
(1 +Â +Ã)
(1¡ q)]+ q¯ ¡ ¯Rt
(17)
Equation (17) reduces to the quadratic expression that characterizes the steady state if we
impose Rt = Rt+1 = R: The dynamics out of the steady state can be investigated with the
help of Figure 2, where we plot equation (17) together with the Rt = Rt+1 line.
8Notice that, when agents have in¯nite lives, our model collapses to a discrete time version of the
Ramsey (1928) model. When q = 1; equation (16) yields the two solutions RL = 1 and RH = 1
¯: RH = 1
¯

























as Rt+1 ! 1:
From equation (17) it is evident that, starting form every point on the left or on the
right of RL; the economy will converge back to RL; while the opposite happens around
RH: Therefore, RH is the unstable equilibrium. As this is a forward-looking, rational-
expectations model, this property should not be regarded as problematic. On the contrary,
it is a very desirable feature. The logic of the rational expectations method is that, if there
is a unique possibility that ensures boundedness, this is the one that will be selected. In
other words, the real interest rateacts as a jump variable, making the model \well behaved"
in terms of dynamics. This con¯rms that, in what follows, we can restrict our attention on
RH:
From Figure 2 is also possible to derive an analysis of the e®ects of the probability of
death onthereal interestrate thatisnot limitedtothe caseinwhichthevalue ofq lies inthe











(1+Â+Ã), that is unambiguously negative. This
implies that a decrease in q; by raising the denominator of (17), will shift the hyperbola
downward, thus raisingRH andlowering RL: Intheunstablesteady-state, anincrease inthe
temporal horizon of agents decreases the real interest rate. This con¯rms that the unstable
steady-state is the one that yields the more sensible result in terms of comparative static,
even if deviations from Ricardian equivalence are large (if q is considerably smaller than 1).
Furthermore, the above result show that, if we start from the Ricardian case (q = 1) and
we reduce the probability of survival, the gross real interest rate in the lower equilibrium
becomes smaller than 1. Again, the lower equilibrium implies a negative nominal interest
rate andcannot be considered awell de¯ned steady state. Unlike inthe previous subsection,
the result derived here proves that this is the outcome even if the reduction from q = 1 is
not marginal.
As we are going to see in what follows, when we reintroduce the public sector in the
model we can use similar arguments to discriminate between equilibria. The conclusions
drawn from this simple version of the model are consistent with the more general case.
4 E®ects of Fiscal Policy
We will now reintroduce the government in the model. In the policy rules studied in this
section government debt is either not allowed or exogenous. The analysis of cases in which
debt is endogenous is carried out in next section.
In the ¯rst policy experiment we look at a balanced budget expansion (G = ¿; D = 0).
In the second one we consider the steady-state e®ects of increasing debt from a constant
level to another constant level. In the latter case, government expenditure is kept constant
and taxes are assumed to adjust endogenously. As the focus is on ¯scal policy, inboth cases
we hold the money supply permanently ¯xed at a constant level M; ruling out seigniorage.
For the reasons explained above we restrict our attention to the higher equilibrium RH:
154.1 Balanced-Budget Expansions
We start considering the case in which the government is allowed to spend but not to use
debt. Assuming a constant level of expenditure perfectly matched by lump-sum taxes in
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Under a policy regime in which G = ¿; the above equation reduces to (16). This im-
plies a quite unexpected result. Although our model is based on some \non neo-classical"
assumptions, like the deviation from Ricardian Equivalence, balanced-budget ¯scal expan-
sions turn out not to a®ect the real interest rate. In Blanchard (1985), the real interest
rate is equated to the marginal productivity of capital. As a balanced-budget expansion
decreases capital in his model, the real interest rate increases. The assumption that labour
is the only factor of productionimplies that, even with ¯nite horizons, following a balanced-
budget expansion our model behaves like the Ramsey one, in which the real interest rate
is independent of movement in G, rather than like Blanchard's.
As in the steady state in°ation is zero, nominal and real interest rates coincide. This
implies no direct e®ect via the interest rate on real balances. Remembering equations (11)
and (12), it is clear that, following a once and for all ¯scal expansion, there will be a
step increase in the quantity of labour supplied and a step decrease in consumption. Both
consumption and leisure fall.9 Money demand, being a function of consumption, falls as
well. The overall welfare e®ect of a balanced-budget ¯scal expansion is therefore negative.
The welfare results of our model are qualitatively the same that can be derived, for
the long run, in a closed-economy version of the Redux model presented by Obstfeld and
Rogo® (1995, 1996).10 In the present model and in the Obstfeld and Rogo® model the
9The reduction in steady-state consumption in our model is consistent with both the Ramsey and
Blanchard models.
10As the present model is a °exible-prices one, it would not be appropriate to compare our results with
16output multiplier is positive and the consumption multiplier is negative, and both are less
than one in absolute value. If we assume Ã < 1; the negative welfare e®ect is mitigated
in our case, compared to the Obstfeld and Rogo® model. When Ã = 1 our model and the
closed-economy version of the Obstfeld and Rogo® model coincide.
A paper that looks at the consequences of a balanced-budget expansion ina sticky-price,
continuous-time, perpetual-youth model with capital accumulation is Rankin and Scalera
(1995). Their results are quitedi®erent from ours. In their model the long-runconsumption
multiplier is positive and the output multiplier is above unity. The authors explain this
as a consequence of the fact that they have investment and capital accumulation. With
no capital accumulation, their model would give the usual Keynesian balanced-budget
multiplier (dY=dG = 1; dC=dG = 0). As we have already stressed in section 2.2, this result
only emerges here in the extreme case of an in¯nite weight of leisure in agents' preferences.
The presence of an endogenous labour supply in our model is su±cient to deviate from the
neo-classical result of a zero output multiplier, even in a °exible price world, but is not
enough to generate the polar result of Rankin and Scalera (1995).
4.2 The Case of Constant Debt
We now turn our attention to another policy, in which the debt is ¯xed exogenously. We
will therefore look at the steady-state e®ect of an increase from one constant level of D to
a new constant level. From the government budget constraint with constant G, D and M;
we have:
¿t = G +rtD
When the government decides to raise the level of steady-state debt, G is kept constant,
and taxes adjust endogenously to meet the increased interest payments.






)s¡t(1¡G ¡ rD) =
1+ r
1+ r ¡ q
(1¡ G ¡ rD); and the steady-state equation for R can be expressed as
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(1+Â+Ã)(1¡G) D ¡ q¯
(19)
The latter expression shows how the analysis becomes more complicated, compared to the
previous cases considered in the paper. We will here present some analytical results on the
e®ects of an increase in debt on the real interest rate in a particular case, that we label the
\reference case".11
In our reference case steady-state debt is initially set to zero (D = 0) and the utility
provided by money is also zero (Â = 0): A case in which initial steady-state debt is ¯xed to
zero is quite a natural one to study, since it is continuous with the no-debt cases previously
considered. As we already know, in the reference case the two steady-state solutions for R
are RL = 1 and RH =
1
¯ . Let's now notice that equation (19) can be rewritten as
(q¯ ¡ k D)R
2 ¡ [1 +q2¯ ¡ (1 ¡ G)k ¡ kD]R + q = 0
where k =
(1+Ã)(1¡q)(1¡q¯)
(1+Â+Ã)(1¡G) : Totally di®erentiating and evaluating in the reference case we
have
[q¯2R¡ (q + q¯)]dR+ (¡kR
2
+ kR)dD
Further, evaluating at the higher steady-state RH = 1






that proves the positive e®ect of an increase in debt on the real interest rate in the reference
case.
11A more general discussion, not reported here for the sake of brevity, can be found in a longer version of
the paper available from the author's homepage: http://econserv2.bess.tcd.ie/ganellig/¯s rules.pdf. The
results presented there con¯rms that those derived for the \reference case" are the most likely to emerge.
18If, as the analysis of the reference case suggests, an increase in the exogenous level of
debt increases the steady-state level of the interest rate, then this policy has two negative
welfare e®ects. The ¯rst one arises through real balances. Since inthe steady state nominal
and real interest rate coincide, an increase in RH implies that agents demand less money,
and this reduces their utility. The second e®ect is due to the fact that an increase in the
real interest rate implies anhigher growth rate of consumption over anindividual's lifetime.
Since average lifetime consumption does not change (the level of per-capita consumption
does not change, see equation 12) , this e®ect increases the imbalance in the lifetime
consumption pro¯le. We could expect, on an intuitive basis, that this would further reduce
lifetime utility.
In Blanchard (1985, p.243), a similar policy reduces the steady-state levels of both
capital and consumption. In his model, therefore, the real interest rate increases unam-
biguously. This is what is likely to happen in our model. In our model, however, we have
no e®ect on per-capita consumption. This di®erence is due to the fact that, keeping the
level of capital constant, we have prevented movements in the real interest rate from hav-
ing direct e®ects on consumption. In Blanchard, the decrease in capital associated with an
increase in R has a direct, negative e®ect on consumption. This does not happen in our
model, because capital does not change.
5 Introduction of a Wealth Tax
In the policy experiments considered so far, government debt was either zero or ¯xed at
a constant level exogenously determined. We now turn to the case in which taxes are a
function of the existing level of debt. In this case both debt and taxes are endogenously
determined.
Since government debt enters as an asset in the portfolio of agents, we refer to this as
a \wealth tax". It is important to stress, however, that this kind of instrument, being a
function of per-capita debt, should not be regarded as a wealth tax in the strictest sense,
i.e. one that distorts agents' decision. From an individual's point of view, the tax is a
19\lump-sum" one. The size of the lump-sum depends on aggregate wealth, but a single
individual has no in°uence on the latter. Examples of taxation imposed on aggregate
wealth, without distortionary consequences, can be found both in the theoretical literature
(for example Rankin and Scalera, 1995) and in large-scale macroeconometric models used
for policy simulations (Mitchell et al. 1999).
Formally, the rule that we are considering, is expressed as
¿t = T +¿Dt
for every t, with 0 < ¿ < 1 and G > T: On an intuitive basis, we would expect that if the
real interest rate is smaller than the rate at which new debt feeds in to new taxes (¿ > rt),
this rule should grant stability, preventing the debt from exploding (see below, equation
20).
The most interesting result in this section is that, contrary to the intuition, we can not
rule out cases in which this rule fails, for realistic parameters values, to ensure the existence
of a well-de¯ned equilibrium with a unique convergent path. If Rt; as it appears in equation
(20) below, was independent of debt (as it is the case in the Ramsey model), then stability
would depend only on the sign of rt ¡ ¿t: If we get instability, then, it must be because of
the dynamics in Rt, which are introduced by the fact that, when q < 1, Rt depends on Dt:
This means that an overlapping generations economy is more likely to be unstable, under a
given wealthtax rule, thana Ramsey economy. Failing to consider the implications of¯nite
horizons implies that rules similar to the one that we are analysing are usually believed,
especially in policy related analysis, to be e®ective in \closing" the model. Mitchell et al.
(1999, pag. 171), for instance, in comparing the properties of di®erent macroeconometric
models, refer to \The speci¯cation of a ¯scal policy reaction function or ¯scal closure rule
that enforces the government's intertemporal budget constraint...". In their analysis, based
on an in¯nite horizons theoretical framework, a tax rule that makes taxation a function of
the existing stock of debt ensures convergence of debt (in the case of no real growth) if ¿
(µ in their notation) is bigger than the (exogenous) real interest rate (Mitchell et al. 1999,
pag. 179).
20The implications of such a rule in our model are investigated in what follows using a
combination of graphical analysis and numerical simulations. Thedynamics of the economy
can be summarized by the following two non-linear di®erence equations in Rt and Dt:
Dt+1 = (Rt ¡ ¿)Dt + G ¡ T (20)
Rt+1 =
1












Equation (20) comes from substituting the tax-rule in to the period by period government
budget constraint with constant G, and M , while (21) is the expression equivalent to (17),
once we take into account that now HPC
t =
P1
s=t ®s;tqs¡t(1 ¡ ¿s) =
P1
s=t ®s;tqs¡t(1 ¡ T ¡
¿Ds):
The locus ¢Dt = 0 is a hyperbola with intercept Dt =
G ¡ T
¿ +1
; and Rt = ¿ + 1 and
Dt = 0 respectively as vertical and horizontal asymptotes. Debt converges back to the
locus on the left of the vertical asymptote (where ¿ > r), and diverges away from it on the
right (where r > ¿). The locus ¢Rt = 0 is the sum of a straight line with positive slope
and of a hyperbola. It tends to the straight line as Rt ! 1 and to the hyperbola as Rt
! 0. Rt decreases above the locus and increases below.
In principle, the existence of steady-state solutions couldbe studied analytically, impos-
ing constant levels of D and R in equations (20) and (21) and solving the system. Doing
this without assigning speci¯c parameters to the values would not allow us to derive neat
expression for the solutions. Before resorting to simulations, however, it is useful to stress
that, combining equations (20) and (21), it is possible to show that the steady-state values
are the solutions of a cubic equation, that therefore has either one or three real roots. All
the possible cases are presented graphically in Figures 3 to 5.12 The three possible steady
states are labelled, starting with the lower, as R1; R2 and R3: If there is only one solution,
12The practice of drawing phase dyagrams for discrete systems is a standard one in modern macroeco-
nomics (see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, pp. 230-31).
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this can only be in the region where r < ¿ (Fig. 3). The case of three solutions can happen
in two di®erent ways: all the solutions where r < ¿ (Fig. 4), or one where r < ¿ and two
where r > ¿ (Fig. 5).
It is evident that steady-states in the region where r > ¿ can only occur for negative
values of debt. The intuition behind this is that when the real interest rate is bigger than
the taxation coe±cient, existing debt generates new debt at a faster rate than it increases
taxation. As a result, it is only possible to have a stable level of debt if this is negative, i.e.
if agents are borrowing from the government. In this case an increase in r is good news for
the government's ¯nance. We are induced to pay little attention to the possibility of such
an outcome, however, on the basis of the observation that equilibria with negative values
of government debt are not very likely in reality. On the normative side, we are interested
in sustainability, so we do not want to suggest a rule that would eliminate government debt
completely.13
What about the region in which r < ¿ ? From Figures 3, 4 and 5 it is clear that the
13A positive level of debt can be a desirable property of an economy, as long as it is sustainable. In our






























Case 1+ b > 








steady-state R1 in this region is globally stable. However, we are quite doubtful about the
practical relevance of this equilibrium, for several reasons. The ¯rst one is that it implies
a multiplicity problem, i.e. there is no unique path along which the system converges.
It is also possible to show that, as in the previous cases, this lower equilibrium is not a
well de¯ned steady-state because it implies a negative nominal interest rate. In order to
show this, we start considering the case in which Ricardian equivalence holds (q = 1): This
yields a discrete-time version of the Ramsey model with a wealth tax. In this situation,
debt ¯nancing becomes irrelevant for the real interest rate, and the solutions for R are
only two, and they are equivalent to the ones that we obtain when there is no government
in the model: RL = 1 and RH =
1
¯
: The ¢R = 0 locus collapses to two vertical lines in
correspondence of the two solutions for R: Figure 6 describes the dynamics in this case.
It is clear that the RL is always a sink, whereas RH implies a positive (negative) debt
and is a saddle (source) if 1 + ¿ >
1
¯
(1 + ¿ <
1
¯
): The equilibrium RH with 1 + ¿ >
1
¯
is therefore the one that yields the case that we consider more satisfactory in terms of the
stability properties, i.e. the saddle path. Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 3, 4 and 5 we
can develop our argument to rule out R1. In Figure 6, where q = 1, the lower equilibrium
24yields a value of 1 for the gross real interest rate. Figures 3, 4 and 5, however, suggest
that when we marginally reduce q from 1 to a value less than 1, the ¢Rt = 0 locus goes
from a straight to an hyperbolic shape. This implies that the RL steady-state goes from
1 to a value smaller than 1, becoming what we have denoted as R1 in ¯gures 3, 4, and
5. As already stressed, a gross real interest rate smaller than 1, means r < 0: Since in
the steady-state, with constant prices, real and nominal interest rate coincide, the lower
steady state implies not only a negative real interest rate, but also a negative nominal
interest rate, that is obviously economically meaningless. The numerical simulations that
we provide below (see Table 1) support this reasoning, yielding always a value less than 1
for R1: We are con¯dent, therefore, that we can rule out this equilibrium.
From the above analysis it follows that the only case in which the economy converges
along a uniquely well de¯ned path to a steady-state with positive debt is when we have
three steady states in the region where r < ¿ (Fig 5). In this case the second steady-state
R2 is a saddle-path, while the third one R3 is a source.
It is useful, at this point, to see which cases are likely to emerge for given parameter
values, and how the government's choices can a®ect the outcome. In our simulation exer-
cises on this case, we start from the following benchmark parametrization: ¯ = :9; q = :9;
Ã = :1; Â = :05; G = :3;T = :2 and ¿ = 0:25: Our benchmark case reproduces a situation
in which agents are not very myopic and the deviation from Ricardian equivalence is not
very high. Also, the utility provided by leisure and real balances is assumed to be small
compared to the one provided by consumption. We also assume that one third of the
maximum amount of work available in every period is used to produce public goods.
This yields a solution in which the three steady state are in the region r < ¿; and a
well de¯ned, convergent steady-state exists. The result of the simulations are summarized
in Table 1.14 Figure 7 was generated in Maple setting the parameters at the benchmark
levels, and it con¯rms the shapes of the loci already illustrated in the theoretical analysis
14In the benchmark case, the selected steady state implies a value of r w 16%: It is worth stressing here
that, since our model is a very simpli¯ed one, our aim here is not to produce realistic estimates of the
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of Figure 5.
Table 1. Steady-state values of R and D for di®erent numerical examples (In column
2,3,4 only the parameters reported have been altered with respect to the benchmark case)
Benchmark q = :85 ¿ = :2 ¿ = :01
R1 = :992 R1 = :987 R1 = :992 R1 = :997
R2 = 1:16 R2 complex root R2 complex root R2 = 1:053
R3 = 1:207 R3 complex root R3 complex root R3 = 1:068
D1 = :338 D1 = :380 D1 = :482 D1 = 7:815
D2 = 1:107 D2 complex root D2 complex root D2 = ¡2:309
D3 = 2:324 D3 complex root D3 complex root D3 = ¡1:713
How do changes inthe parameters of the model a®ect thesolutions? Keeping everything
else constant, a reduction in q from .9 to .85 gives complex roots for the second and third
steady state. Therefore, we are left only with the R1 solution (See Table 1, column 2).15 A
moderate reduction in ¿ (for example, from .25 to .2) has the same e®ect (Table 1, column
3), while if the reduction is drastic (for example, from .25 to .01), we have the case of one
steady-state with positive debt and two with negative debt (Table 1, column 4). Notice
that in this numerical example we have a saddle-path corresponding to positive debt when
15A similar result emerges if we reduce the discount rate to ¯ = :85 keeping q = :9:
261+ ¿ = 1:25 >
1
¯
= 1:11; and a saddle path with negative debt when
1
¯
= 1:11 > 1+ ¿ =
1:01: The eigenvalues for the relevant (positive debt) steady-state have been calculated for
this parametrization and are reported in Table 2, con¯rming that it is a saddle-path.
Table 2. Eigenvalues for the (R2;D2) steady-state in the benchmark case
Steady-state Eigenvalues
R2 = 1:16;D2 = 1:107 ¸1 = :951; ¸2 = 1:169
Although the properties of the solutions depend on the vector of all the parameters,
the previous analysis suggests that a well-de¯ned saddle-path is more likely to emerge for
higher values of ¿: In some cases, the tax coe±cient on debt needed to ensure a saddle-path
with positive debt could be quite high. We therefore suggest that a government that is
faced with the dilemma of designing a policy rule that is sustainable and at the same time
allows a positive debt steady state could choose an alternative policy rule. In this new rule
taxes are a function not only of debt, but also of the divergence between the real interest
rate and the taxation coe±cient on debt. To clarify our motivations in proposing such a
rule, let's consider the following parametrization, in which the deviation from Ricardian
equivalence is larger than in the benchmark case: ¯ = :9; q = :685; Ã = :1; Â = :05;
G = :3; T = :2 and ¿ = 0:25: This is a case that produces only one equilibrium (Table
3, column 1). As we know from the previous analysis, this is not a well de¯ned steady
state. If the government increases ¿ to 0:6; however, we can have a well de¯ned steady
state with a positive level of debt, to which the economy converges along a saddle-path
(Table 3, column 2).
A saddle-path with positive debt, however, can also be obtained if the government
introduces the alternative rule
¿t = T + ¿1Dt + ¿2(rt ¡ ¿1) (22)
setting the following tax rates: T = :25; ¿1 = :07; ¿2 = :5 (Table 3, column 3). The
eigenvalues corresponding to this steady-state are reported in Table 4.
Table 3. Introduction of a interest-tax rule
27q = :685 q = :685;¿ = 0:6 q = :685;¿1 = 0:7;¿2 = :5
R1 = :965 R1 = :958 R1 = :98
R2 complex root R2 = 1:25 R2 = 1:17
R3 complex root R3 = 1:49 R3 = 1:2
D1 = :351 D1 = :158 D1 = 1:053
D2 complex root D2 = :285 D2 = :0048600
D3 complex root D3 = :877 D3 = :1054469
Table 4. Eigenvalues for the (R2;D2) steady-state in interest-tax rule case
Steady-state Eigenvalues
R2 = 1:17;D2 = :0048 ¸1 = ¡:059; ¸2 = 1:104
With this rule we can have a saddle-path with positive level of debt in the region
where r > ¿. The intuition behind this is quite straightforward. As we said previously,
when the real interest rate is bigger than the taxation coe±cient on debt, taxes are not
growing enough to close the debt if this is positive, so stability can only be achieved for
negative levels of debt. In the case of the new rule, we can have a positive debt steady
state because, even though the real interest rate is bigger than the taxation coe±cient on
debt, the additional tax component increases with the real interest rate, preventing the
debt from exploding.
From equation (22) it is clear that the new tax rule is taking into account not only the
level of the debt (the stock), but also the stream of payments for the government that the
existing level of debt is generating. The new taxation component is proportional to the
net gains, for the agents, from holding a unit of debt, that is a °ow variable. If the ¿1Dt
component can be assimilated to a wealth-tax (that hits astock), the ¿2(rt¡¿1) component
can be considered a tax on income from ¯nancial capital.
Formally, with the new tax rule the di®erence equations governing the system are


























The ¢Dt = 0 locus is still the sum of an hyperbola and of a straight line. The








In graphical terms, the introduction of the new component in taxation shifts the hor-
izontal asymptote of the ¢Dt = 0 locus above zero (to D = ¿2); and makes possible a
saddle-path equilibrium for a positive level of debt in the region where r > ¿ (Fig. 8).
In the case ofthe numerical example that we have provided, the main advantage ofusing
this alternative rule lays in the fact that a ¯scal package that implies a much lower tax rate
on debt (¿1 = 0:7), a small increase in the lump-sum component in taxes (T increases from
.2 to .25) and the introduction of the new tax component (at the rate ¿2 = :5); could be
more feasible, from a political point of view, than the alternative of a huge increase of the
tax coe±cient on debt to .6. A rule like the one that we are proposing would approximate
the e®ects of a rule in which debt inclusive of interest (for example ¿t = ¿RtDt); but
could have the advantage of being more feasible from a political point of view. As we
already stressed in the introduction, we do not intend to argue that such a rule would be
optimal. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis could give some useful indication to
29policy makers about a possible way to follow in a situation in which political constraint
prevent more drastic measures, like an increase in the taxation of debt (or a reduction in
government expenditure). We are not explicitly considering in the model the possibility
that agents could refuse to subscribe new public debt when this is being taxed, or when the
tax coe±cient on this increase drastically, how it would be necessary to achieve stability
in the example that we have summarized in Table 4, column 2 . The latter is, however, an
example of what we mean by political constraints. Our analysis also gives some warnings
about the excessive faith put in the literature and in policy analysis in ¯scal \closure" rules
since, as we have seen, these can fail to generate a well-de¯ned steady-state for sensible
parameters values.
Our analysis is, of course, subject to several caveats. One is the practical working of
a rule that makes taxation a function of the real interest rate. It could be problematic,
for example, to decide which exact measure of the nominal rates and prices to choose to
build the real rate that taxes should target. Furthermore, even if in our model output is
¯xed, in real economies increases in the real interest rate are likely to be associated with
periods of recession. This means that also the alternative rule that we are proposing could
be the object of political criticism, since it would be problematic to introduce a rule that
automatically increases taxes during a recession. In addition to this, such a rule would give
to the monetary authorities a certain degree of (indirect) power on ¯scal policy.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses a modi¯ed version of the Blanchard (1985) model of perpetual youth to
investigate the dynamic e®ects of di®erent ¯scal policy rules. The main ¯nding of the paper
is that a simple ¯scal closure rule, based on a wealth tax, could be insu±cient to ensure the
existence of a well de¯ned saddle-path equilibrium even when the tax rate exceeds the real
interest rate. We suggest that an alternative way of solving this problem could be to add
another taxation component, that takes in to account the level of the real interest rate.
Our model is characterized by perfect competition and fully °exible prices. An obvious
30direction in which the work done here could be extended is the introduction of larger
departures from neo-classical assumptions. In particular, it could be interesting to consider
a version of the model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. This would allow
an analysis of how the policy rules analyzed in the current paper interact with market
imperfections. Studying ¯scal rules in a two-country framework would also be relevant. In
this direction, a natural extension would be combining the work presented here with the
New Open Economy Macroeconomics framework introduced by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995,
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